Convergent? Minds? Some questions about mental evolution by Cartmill, Matt
For Review Only
 
 
 
 
 
 
Convergent?  Minds?  Some Questions about Mental 
Evolution 
 
 
Journal: Interface Focus 
Manuscript ID Draft 
Article Type: Discussion 
Date Submitted by the Author: n/a 
Complete List of Authors: Cartmill, Matt; Boston University, Anthropology 
Subject: Synthetic biology < CROSS-DISCIPLINARY SCIENCES 
Keywords: 
Mental evolution, Comparative psychology, Evolutionary convergence, 
Animal consciousness 
  
 
 
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rsfs
Under review for Interface Focus
For Review Only
 
 
 
Convergent?  Minds?  Some Questions about Mental Evolution 
 
 
 
Submitted as part of a symposium on "Convergent Minds" 
edited by Russell Powell and Irina Mikhalevich 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Matt Cartmill 
Boston University 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Address all correspondence to: 
Matt Cartmill, Dept. of Anthropology, 
Boston University, 22 Bay State Rd., 
Boston, MA 02215 US 
  
Page 1 of 30
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rsfs
Under review for Interface Focus
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Review Only
ABSTRACT: In investigating convergent minds, we need to be sure that the things we 
are looking at are both minds and convergent.  In determining whether a shared character 
state represents a convergence between two organisms, we must know the wider 
distribution and primitive state of that character so that we can map that character and its 
state transitions onto a phylogenetic tree.  When we do this, some apparently primitive 
shared traits may prove to represent convergent losses of cognitive capacities.  To avoid 
having to talk about the minds of plants and paramecia, we need to go beyond 
assessments of behaviorally defined cognition to ask questions about mind in the primary 
sense of the word, defined by the presence of mental events and consciousness.  These 
phenomena depend upon the possession of brains of adequate size and centralized 
ontogeny and organization.  They are probably limited to vertebrates.  Recent discoveries 
suggest that consciousness is adaptively valuable as a late error detection mechanism in 
the initiation of action, and point to experimental techniques for assessing its presence or 
absence in nonhuman mammals. 
 
    
 
 The title of this symposium is "Convergent Minds."  I wish to raise some 
questions about both words in that title. 
 
 For two things to qualify as convergent minds, they have to be (a) convergences 
and (b) minds.  The first qualification is easier to evaluate than the second.  The word 
"convergence" has a special technical meaning in evolutionary biology.  For those who 
are used to thinking in phylogenetic terms, what follows may be obvious.  But it may 
nevertheless be worth pointing out, because experience shows that even people who are 
very sophisticated biologists in other respects sometimes make mistakes in evolutionary 
thinking. 
 
 Determining whether a particular resemblance between two species represents a 
convergence or not requires that we know how they fit into a larger phylogenetic picture 
— the tree of evolutionary relationships — and what the trait in question looked like in 
their last common ancestor.  In general, a trait that was present in that ancestor cannot be 
a convergence between two of its descendants.  This entails that (for instance) no mental 
properties that humans share with chimpanzees, our closet living relatives, can be 
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identified as convergences, because we have no way of knowing whether athey were 
present in the last common ancestor of the two.   
 
 All this has a bearing on the way we need to think about these issues.  The so-
called mirror test for self-awareness developed in 1970 by G. G. Gallup, Jr. [1] provides 
an example of why and how phylogeny matters.  In this test, the experimental subjects 
are anesthetized and have a visible mark placed on their faces.  Control animals receive a 
mark that is invisible but feels and smells the same.  After recovering from anesthesia, 
each subject is presented with a mirror.  If, upon seeing their reflection, the experimental 
subjects touch or otherwise clearly respond to the mark on their faces but the control 
subjects do not, the species passes the test.   
 
 This test has been interpreted as an index of awareness of self, of one's own body 
as a thing.   The meaning of the test is debated, for a number of reasons.  In all species 
thus far tested (including humans), at least some individuals fail the mirror test, 
suggesting that it gives false negatives.  Some animals (e.g., gibbons, tamarins) fail to 
touch obviously visible marks applied to their limbs [2-3], thereby rendering the whole 
test irrelevant; and some experimenters have failed to include this important check in 
their protocols.  Animals that rely heavily on senses other than sight may simply ignore a 
mirror because they perceive that the reflection is an illusion. 
 
 But whatever the mirror test implies about mentation, few nonhuman animals can 
pass it.  To date, it has been passed unequivocally only by hominoid primates and 
magpies (Pica), and arguably by bottlenosed dolphins (Tursiops) and one Asian elephant 
(Elephas) [4-9].  Other animals that have been tested, including giant pandas, sea lions, 
and jackdaws [10-12], have failed the test.  Among primates, some chimpanzees and 
orangutans can pass it, but New and Old World monkeys (and very young human 
children, or patients with advanced Alzheimer's disease) cannot [2-3, 13-19].  The case of 
gorillas is equivocal.  Most gorillas that have been tested have failed.  A few have shown 
clear signs of self-recognition on mark tests, but only after training or extensive 
familiarity with mirrors [20-25].   
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 When we map mirror-test performance onto a phylogenetic tree, it becomes clear 
that one parsimonious interpretation of the facts is that gorillas have lost, or are in the 
process of losing, a capacity for self-recognition that humans and the other great apes 
have retained from a common ancestor back in the Miocene (white squares, Fig. 1).   This 
too is a kind of convergence of minds — in this case, convergence with a more remote 
ancestor that lacked the faculty of self-recognition.  Jumping to this conclusion, some 
authors have tried to account for this puzzling loss of an ancestral capacity preserved in 
humans. Povinelli and Cant [26] explain the concept of self (or whatever it is that the 
Gallup test measures) as a locomotor adaptation, related to the need for self-awareness in 
a large-bodied tree-climber and lost in the terrestrial gorilla. Gallup, who also thinks that 
gorillas have lost self-awareness secondarily, suggests that self-awareness is 
advantageous to males competing for access to females (supposedly not a problem for 
gorilla males, who guard females in single-male groups) [27].   
 
 Both these explanations can be questioned; but both are rendered unnecessary if 
we assume that enhanced awareness of self developed independently in the orangutan 
lineage and the Pan-Homo clade (black squares, Fig, 1) but not in gorillas.  Both 
interpretations are equally parsimonious, involving two character-state transitions.  But 
they imply different evolutionary changes and different possible explanations.  In the 
present state of our knowledge, there are no grounds for choosing between these two 
interpretations.   
 
 Another illustration of the importance of phylogenetic mapping  involves the 
curious fact that it is impossible to train most animals to move to the beat of a drum [28].  
Evidently most animals hear the sounds but do not apprehend the rhythm in a way that 
allows them to couple their body movements to it.  Recently, however, it has been shown 
that at least two and possibly more species of parrots can "dance" — that is, entrain their 
body movements to a musical beat and adjust their timing to changes in the tempo of the 
music [29-30].  Both parrot species are accomplished vocal mimics.  It has accordingly 
been suggested that vocal imitation and rhythmic entrainment are different aspects of a 
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single faculty, which has evolved convergently in humans and at least these two parrot 
species [29-31].  Understanding the causes and correlates of the imitative faculty would 
contribute greatly to our understanding of human evolution.  But on the basis of the facts 
presented, we cannot tell whether the supposed faculty exists.  A capacity for vocal 
mimicry may be intrinsically coupled with rhythmic entrainment, precede it as a potential 
cause, or follow it as a potential effect.  To tell which, we need to seek cases in which the 
two sorts of imitation are decoupled.  Such cases exist.  Some phocid seals are apparently 
capable of vocal mimicry but not of entraining movements to a musical beat [31], 
whereas the reverse is true of some otariid seals [32].  Similar disjunctions of these two 
faculties appear among birds, where vocal mimicry has evolved convergently in several 
orders and families not known to be capable of coupling body movements to music [29].  
We would like to know how these two human-like faculties have evolved or been lost in 
various birds and mammals, and whether one is a necessary precondition or an 
epiphenomenon of the other.  To learn these things, we have to test additional species to 
permit phylogenetic mapping of the distributions of the two traits. 
 
 Placing questions about convergence of mind in a phylogenetic context also helps 
to dispel the myth of the "psychological scale" that has dogged comparative psychology.  
There is a serious temptation in talking about the evolution of mind to fall into a pre-
Darwinian way of thinking about mental capacities as arrayed along a linear sequence, a 
manifestation of the old Scala Naturae.  Unless otherwise specified, we tend to think of 
"convergent minds" as convergent with our own in a linear fashion, via progression up 
the scale.  This way of thinking is imbedded in Morgan's Canon, formulated by C. L. 
Morgan in the following often-quoted words: 
 
In no case may we interpret an action as the outcome of the 
exercise of a higher psychological faculty, if it can be interpreted 
as the outcome of the exercise of one which stands lower in the 
psychological scale [33:53].  
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 Morgan's Canon is often justified as a special case of Occam's Razor, the principle 
that our accounts of the world should make do with as few concepts and assumptions as 
possible. But this is a mistake.  The Razor does not imply the Canon.  Since we are 
already compelled by experience to acknowledge our own mental events, we add nothing 
to our ontological catalogue by attributing similar mental phenomena to animals. Indeed, 
it would seem on the face of it that it would be simpler to do just that, applying similar 
explanations to similar phenomena whenever the facts permit.  Morgan himself 
recognized the force of this objection.  "Is there not some contradiction in refusing to do 
so?" he asked.  "For, first, it is contended that we must use the human mind as a key by 
which to read the brute mind, and then it is contended that this key must be applied with a 
difference.  If we apply the key at all, should we not apply it without reservation?" 
[33:55]    
 
 His answer, that we should not, was grounded in a picture of evolution as a 
temporal reading-out of the Great Chain of Being.  Like many people at the time, Morgan 
saw evolution as a narrative of the ascent of life from mere protoplasm up through 
"grades of organisms, with divergently increasing complexity of organic structure and 
correlated ... mental or psychical complexity," to the lofty pinnacle of the human 
condition, in which "... the organic complexity, the complexity of correlated activities, 
and the associated mental or psychical complexity, has reached the maximum as yet 
attained." [33:55]    
 
 By substituting "evolutionary scale" for "psychological scale" and "humanlike" 
for "higher" in Morgan's Canon, we can see what Morgan really meant: namely, that we 
should never explain other animals' behavior as the outcome of humanlike mental 
phenomena if we can devise any alternative explanation — not because it would be 
unparsimonious to do so (it would not), but because anthropomorphism confuses the 
picture of the great linear progression up the ladder of mental evolution.  But there is no 
"psychological scale" and no linear progression.  Once we rid ourselves of that antique 
scalar preconception and start thinking about mental convergence in genuinely 
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phylogenetic terms, Morgan's Canon no longer seems either parsimonious or plausible 
[34]. 
 
 "Convergence" is not a single variable.  Brains and behaviors, and presumably 
minds, can evolve in many directions.  Different environmental situations select for 
different changes in brain size, behavioral flexibility, and cognitive complexity.  This can 
entail convergences that have little or nothing to do with modern human cognitive 
capacities.  The case of gorillas and the mirror test shows that we can learn at least as 
much from studying losses as from studying the sort of accumulation of resemblances to 
ourselves that we tend to concentrate on in this connection.  The goatlike extinct 
Pleistocene sheep Myotragus, which lived on the Balearic Islands off the Mediterranean 
coast of Spain [35] represents a related case.  Unlike wild goats and sheep, Myotragus 
had short, stubby legs, small and frontally directed eyes, and an unusually small brain 
[36-38].  In cross-section, its bones exhibit periodic growth rings, suggesting that it had a 
cold-blooded, reptile-like physiology [39].  A similar reduction in brain size has occurred 
in some other island mammals [40-43].  These convergences have been plausibly 
interpreted as adaptations for coping with limited food resources, especially in 
environments where reduced pressures from predators allow animals to get away with 
making economies in brain tissue [40]  Possible examples of the same phenomenon are 
seen in the Late Miocene ape Oreopithecus and the Pleistocene insular-dwarf human 
Homo floresiensis, both of which lived on islands and had much smaller brains than 
would be expected for animals of their clades and body sizes [40, 44].  All these cases 
can be interpreted as another sort of convergence of minds — in this case, the evolution 
of reduced intelligence as a dietary adaptation.  Similar reduction in brain size is 
characteristic of almost all domesticated mammals, probably as a convergent response to 
reduction in predator pressures [46-49].  The reduction in brain volume seen in modern 
human populations over the past 20,000 years has been analyzed as part of a similar 
process of "self-domestication" [50-51], but is probably better explained as a corollary of 
reduction in body size [52].   
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 Of the 30-odd phyla of multicellular animals currently recognized, only three — 
arthropods, chordates, and mollusks —have evolved what the cognitive scientist Michael 
Trestman has referred to [53] as "complex, active bodies" featuring articulated and 
differentiated appendages, high mobility guided by distance-sensing organs, and a 
capability for active manipulation of objects.  It seems reasonable to think  that this 
cluster of properties is a necessary substrate for mental evolution; and the three phyla that 
evince them are precisely the groups in which evidence of such properties as behavioral 
plasticity have led the contributors to this symposium to try to discern the mental 
convergences.  It is not self-evident, however, that convergent behaviors necessarily 
furnish evidence for convergent minds.   
 
 Consider, as an example, the jumping spiders (Salticidae) of the genus Portia.  
These animals feed chiefly on web-spinning spiders, which they often approach by wide-
swinging, circuitous detours that break visual contact with the prey, being careful to 
remain out of sight and to avoid approaching the prey directly.  Having made their way to 
a concealed spot at the edge of a web, they wait for a light breeze that ruffles the web, 
then make contact with it and begin plucking at it to produce vibrations that mimic the 
struggles of snared insects.  They try one pattern after another, sometimes keeping it up 
for days, concentrating on patterns that induce movement of the web-builder toward 
them.  Eventually it approaches too close, and they jump on it and kill it — using 
different combat tactics, depending on the prey.   
 
 All this is very sophisticated and plastic behavior, incorporating what appears to 
be long-term intentionality, learning, and insight [54-59].  An opossum would not be 
capable of it; it would take something like a rather clever cat.  Some other spider-eating 
arthropods have evolved similar flexible and plastic hunting behaviors and similar 
cognitive capacities [60-61].   These remarkable abilities represent evolutionary 
convergences with Portia, and arguably with cats.  And yet I would be very reluctant to 
talk about these as examples of convergent minds, because I would be reluctant to talk 
about the mind of a jumping spider or assassin bug. These are small arthropods with 
brains containing a few hundred thousand neurons.  We do not know what the material 
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basis of mental events is, but it is clear that there is one and that it depends on the brain.  
(We know this because conscious mentation can be abolished by toxins or traumas that 
differentially affect the brain.)  Whatever that material basis is, I doubt that a mass of 
neurons the size of a pinhead is sufficient to produce it.  I suspect that while that there is 
something that it is like to be a cat, being a jumping spider is an experience like being a 
thermostat or a computer — that is, it is not an experience at all.  If so, I am inclined to 
say that the convergence in behavior between jumping spiders and cats does not 
constitute evidence of convergent minds. 
 
 This brings me to the second word in the topic of this symposium -- namely, 
"minds."  Deep philosophical pitfalls and morasses open at our feet as soon as that word 
enters into our discourse.  I would like to avoid falling into these, but I feel compelled to 
further explore the question of whether behavior without mental events can count as 
evidence for convergence of minds.   
 
 Like the drunkard who lost his keys in the park but searched for them under the 
street lamp because the light was better there, scientists tend to equate "mind" with 
"cognition" because there are ways of detecting and measuring the latter.  "Mind," 
understood in terms of this equation, is simply a name for those processes in the brain 
that generate and control such complex and plastic behaviors as problem-solving, 
counting, attentive learning, and spatial mapping.  These behaviors are taken as 
constituting "cognition," and convergent acquisitions of such capacities are taken as 
constituting convergence of minds.  The difficulty here is that some of these capacities 
can be demonstrated in creatures lacking brains or even nervous systems, including 
plants, single-celled eukaryotes, and isolated cells extracted from the human body [62-
68].   Talking about "cognition" in all these organisms or parts of organisms entails a 
radical change in the meaning of the word.  There is nothing wrong with any of this, as 
long as we recognize that we are no longer talking about the same topics and issues that 
we started off with.  We may find many interesting things under this street lamp, but we 
should not hope that they will include the missing keys. 
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 I follow the philosopher John Searle [69] in thinking that the fundamental issue 
here is the presence or absence of intentionality in the philosophical sense; that 
intentionality is impossible without consciousness; and that it is misleading to talk about 
mental phenomena in unconscious organisms.  Some quantum-consciousness theorists 
suggest that  "the fabric of consciousness may be present within all eukaryotic cells," and 
that it has something to do with microtubules [70].  To me, this idea seems to contradict 
our common experience of the fluctuation of consciousness, which disappears every night 
during sleep.  Its disappearance is correlated with organ-level changes in the activity of 
our brains as a whole, not with changes at an ultrastructural level.  It seems reasonable to 
think that our subjective awareness of the world is an emergent property of whole-brain 
activity, and that most organisms lack it.   
 
 If we accept all this, then consciousness, mental events, minds, and the 
philosophers' "intentionality" -- the property of being about something — must require  
brains, of a certain minimal size and a certain sort of organization.  This inference 
warrants the exclusion of brainless organisms from our search for convergent minds.  
Since many brainless organisms evince "cognition" in the behavioral sense, I suggest that 
that sense of the word is not good enough for our purposes.  It may well be that plants can 
send and receive signals, alter their responses to stimuli in adaptive ways, and even 
respond differently to stimuli that number below or above a certain threshold value [63]. 
Nevertheless, they are not thinking, learning, or counting when they do these things, any 
more than an abacus or a box of rocks are calculating if I pick them up and shake them.  I 
suggest that intentionality is required for something to count as calculation or as 
cognition, and that brains of a certain size and organization are required for intentionality.  
A plant is not about anything.  It is the way it is, not because its parts or its whole want 
something, or are intended for something, or are aimed at doing something, but because 
that configuration has the property of self-copying more reliably and effectively than 
other, slightly different configurations.   
 
 Why should we care about the presence or absence of mental events in organisms, 
as long as they are operationally or behaviorally cognitive?  Many eminent thinkers have 
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argued that mental events have no function— that they are caused by physical events in 
the brain but are not capable of causing physical events.  T. H. Huxley, one of the early 
advocates of this thesis, summed it up like this: 
 
It seems to me that in men, as in brutes, there is no proof that any 
state of consciousness is the cause of change in the motion of the 
matter of the organism. If these positions are well based, it follows 
that our mental conditions are simply the symbols in consciousness 
of the changes which take place automatically in the organism . . . 
We are conscious automata [71]. 
 
 This thesis is known as epiphenomenalism. If it is correct — if mental events are 
functionless, end-of-the line side effects that cannot cause physical events — then mental 
events and subjective experience have no adaptive value, and we are justified in ignoring 
them in comparative psychology.   
 
 There are empirical as well as philosophical reasons for accepting some version of 
epiphenomenalism.  We all know from experience that we are not even aware of many of 
our "voluntary" movements.  Many investigators [72-75] have shown that our brains and 
skeletal muscles usually begin to initiate movements before we are aware of having 
"decided" to move.  But this is not always the case.  I may consciously decide to do 
something next Tuesday.  And recent experiments have shown that even for spontaneous 
movements that have already started to manifest themselves as unwilled cortical 
"readiness potentials," there is a short window of time (around 800 µs) during which a 
conscious decision can abort the movement [74-75], though a point of no return is 
reached after which a conscious decision to abort has no effect.  These facts comport with 
the late Jeffrey Gray's thesis [76] that consciousness functions as a "late error-detection 
mechanism" — a domain of perception and evaluation, into which multi-modal sensory 
inputs, objectives, plans, and impending motor outputs are channeled by unconscious 
parts of the brain and integrated into constructs that reveal mismatches and discrepancies, 
which the executive parts of the brain then use in terminating or correcting future action.   
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 Interpreting consciousness as a late error-detection mechanism ascribes an 
adaptive value to it, and gives us theoretical reasons for thinking that it may have evolved 
convergently.  But because we do not know what sorts of brain events are necessary and 
sufficient to produce it, we cannot (yet) produce any conclusive positive evidence for it in 
other animals.  It may be that nonhuman animals are what philosophers refer to as 
"philosophical zombies."  There is a substantial literature arguing the question of whether 
zombies — that is, creatures who behave exactly like humans but whose actions are 
unaccompanied by mental events — are possible or even conceivable [77-79].   But as far 
as I know, there is no logical or philosophical difficulty in thinking that nonhuman 
animals are philosophical zombies, and that none of their behaviors are accompanied by 
mental events [34]. 
 
 Though we cannot yet conclusively demonstrate conscious awareness in 
nonhuman animals, we can be confident in ruling it out in some of them.  We have 
decisive reasons for believing that brains must be involved.  The production of mental 
events must be constrained by both the organization and size of those brains.  The 
fundamental differences between our brains and those of arthropods and molluscs has to 
count heavily against their having "minds" in the ordinary sense of the word.  These 
animals have "brains" only in the analogical sense in which a fly has "legs" or "wings."  
As noted elsewhere in this symposium, some molluscs (squid and octopuses) have the 
largest "brains" of any invertebrates, with brain/body mass ratios intermediate between 
those of reptiles and mammals [80].  They evince a lot of behavioral plasticity and 
capacity for learning.  But the centralized parts of their nervous systems have an entirely 
different developmental and evolutionary history from those of vertebrates.  Whereas the 
vertebrate brain is an ontogenetically and phylogenetically unitary elaboration of the 
front end of the primitive chordate dorsal nerve cord, the "brains" of cephalopods evolved 
from a circumoral ring of originally separate ganglia, which have secondarily coalesced 
where growth has brought them into contact.  Roughly 75% of the neurons in the "brain" 
of an octopus are located in the two widely separated optic lobes at the base of each eye, 
which are associated with processing of visual input from the retina.  A large proportion 
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of its remaining neural tissue is concentrated in big peripheral ganglia at the bases of its 
tentacles, which provide each "arm" with a sort of secondary brain that can function 
entirely independently from the central ganglia [81].   It seems correspondingly less 
likely that these diffuse neural arrangements can harbor or generate some sort of 
unifiying central consciousness.   
 
 All vertebrate brains share an ontogenetic unity and a common Bauplan, but they 
differ considerably in absolute and relative size.  It is not clear to what extent 
consciousness, or even behavioral capacities, are dependent upon these metrics.  
Biologists usually equate absolute size with mass, but in every other respect a 500-gram 
hawk with a 1-meter wingspan is a much bigger animal than a 500-gram musk turtle 
measuring 10 cm in length.  The two weigh the same because natural selection has 
engineered the bird for aerial lightness and the smaller turtle for pond-diving density.  
Even the brains of flying birds hav  evolved to minimize weight, enabling them to do a 
great deal with very little.  This factor makes it hard to compare encephalization in birds 
and mammals.  Some birds have evolved startling mental convergences with the most 
humanlike mammals, extending in the cases of parrots and corvids to an ability to make 
innovative tools and use simplified versions of human languages.  They do these things 
using brains the size of walnuts.  Evidently, a milliliter of bird brain is worth more than 
the average milliliter of mammal brain. 
 
 Most of the past scientific literature on encephalization has operated on a different 
assumption: that the crucial variable in explaining differences and similarities in 
cognitive capacities is relative brain size, measured in terms of deviation from some 
interspecific regression of brain mass against body mass.  This method of comparison 
was adopted to provide a standard by which human brains could be seen as in some sense 
uniquely large despite the annoying fact that some nonhuman mammals have brains or 
brain/body weight ratios that are larger than ours [82-83].  But in recent years, evidence 
has accumulated that this assumption is simply wrong.   Among nonhuman primates, 
behavioral measures of cognitive capacities have likewise been found to correlate well 
with absolute brain size, absolute neocortical volume, and body mass — but not with 
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encephalization quotients or deviations (residuals) from brain-body regression lines [84].  
Holekamp reports similar findings from another mammalian order, Carnivora, elsewhere 
in this symposium.  If these findings hold up and apply to other groups, it would appear 
that vertebrate "intelligence" depends roughly on the absolute number of neurons in an 
animal's brain over and above the basic minimum needed for maintenance of body 
functions [83, 85].  If this is so, then large animals should on the whole be more 
intelligent than small ones.  We therefore need to ask why crows and parrots, with their 
absolutely small brains, are as intelligent as they are, and why elephants and cetaceans 
with their extremely large brains are not more intelligent than humans.   
 
 The answers to these questions seem to reside in two factors: the size and packing 
of cerebral neurons, and their distribution across different parts of the brain.  The neurons 
of bird brains are very small and tightly packed, so that a milliliter of avian brain contains 
on the average from 2 to 4 times as many neurons as a milliliter of mammalian brain; and 
whereas the vast majority of the neurons in the brains of mammals lie in the cerebellum, 
over most of the brain neurons in owls, songbirds, and parrots lie in the pallial equivalent 
of the mammalian cerebral cortex [86].  A one-kilogram parrot therefore has about 12% 
more "cortical" neurons in its brain than a rhesus monkey weighing seven times as much.  
This difference may account for the parrot's superior cognitive capacities.  There is a 
similar difference in the packing of cortical neurons between primates and some other 
mammals, with primates having up to seven times as many neurons per milliliter of 
cortex as a rodent of comparable body size [83, 87]. 
 
 Conversely, an elephant's cerebral cortex, which has about twice the volume of a 
human's, contains only about one-third the number of neurons; and over 97% of its 
cerebral neurons lie in its conspicuously enlarged cerebellum [88].  These differences 
may explain why the behavioral and cognitive capacities of elephants do not equal or 
exceed our own.  At present, however, their functional significance is not clear.  
Neuroimaging studies have shown that the human cerebellum is active not only in 
coordinating movements, but also in a variety of cognitive tasks [89].  An elephant's huge 
cerebellum may be contributing as much to cognition as to the control of its complicated 
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trunk musculature.  It should be noted that humans and great apes have also undergone a 
marked enlargement of the cerebellum in comparison to other primates and primitive 
mammals [90-91].  This neuroanatomical convergence between elephants and apes may 
reflect special convergences in cognitive capacities. 
 
 As the case of the diffuse cephalopod "brain" reminds us, patterns of 
interneuronal connections are also relevant in assessing cognitive and mental 
convergence.  The myelinated cortical fibers in primate brains are thicker than those of 
cetaceans and elephants, and should have a correspondingly higher conduction velocity 
[85].  This difference in conduction velocity may contribute to the observed disparity in 
cognitive abilities among these extremely large-brained animals.   
 
 Cetaceans also have a surprisingly small corpus callosum [92].  The reduction of 
this big commissure connecting th  two cerebral hemispheres must make it more difficult 
for the two hemispheres to "talk" to each other.  This disjunction is coupled in cetaceans 
with a unique sleeping pattern, in which one hemisphere remains awake and active (with 
one eye open) while the other displays deep slow-wave sleep and a lowered metabolism 
[93-94].  If consciousness and mental events occur in cetaceans, they must be able to 
manifest themselves in the right and left halves of the brain by turns.  All this suggests 
that a dolphin may be in effect a natural split-brain experiment, in which two cognitively 
separated individuals in effect co-exist in the same body.  Whether subjective 
consciousness and a sense of self exist in either hemisphere, neither, or both is at present 
a matter for conjecture.  In a recent review article based on his 45 years of experience 
with split-brain patients [95], Michael Gazzaniga suggests that in humans, a sense of self 
is constructed by a left-hemisphere interpreter on the basis of input from distributed 
networks on both sides of the brain.  If so, then there may not be anything that it is like to 
be a dolphin — or it may be two separate experiences.  Unihemispheric sleep (with one 
eye open) also occurs in seals, manatees, and most  birds.  But unlike cetaceans, these 
animals sometimes exhibit bihemispheric and REM sleep of the familiar mammalian sort 
[96, 97].  It seems correspondingly somewhat more likely that there is something that it is 
like to be a parrot or a sea lion. 
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 If consciousness is not something intrinsic to all organisms, then presumably it 
has evolved in us, and perhaps in other animals, to perform one or more functions that 
were not adequately served by prior, unconscious neural mechanisms.  To me, as an 
untutored outsider to these fields, it seems that the simplest way to begin an experimental 
search for other minds is to identify such functions, determine in which species they are 
served, and investigate their neurological concomitants in humans and other animals.  In 
human beings, conscious mentation functions as part of a late error detection mechanism, 
involved in judging, and if necessary cancelling, voluntary acts initiated at an 
unconscious level.  In the experimental work cited above on conscious decision-making 
by humans [72-75. 98], an unconscious cortical "readiness potential" was found to 
precede spontaneous (unconditioned) action by several hundred milliseconds, with 
subjects experiencing a conscious intention to move roughly midway between the two 
events — and able, if rewarded, to make a decision to abort up to 200 µs before the 
movement.  Wholly or partly homologous pre-movement readiness potentials, differing 
in timing and degree of complexity, have been found in rats, cats, and macaques [99-
101], and presumably exist in many other mammals.  By adapting the experimental 
procedures used on humans, it should be possible to determine whether any of these 
animals have a late error detection mechanism capable of aborting a voluntary movement 
launched at the unconscious level.  Positive findings from such experiments would 
demonstrate the existence of two levels of decision-making, corresponding to the 
separation between the conscious and unconscious mind in humans.  Such findings might 
provide genuine empirical evidence for a domain of conscious mentation and volition in 
nonhuman animals, and open the way for an investigation of the convergence of "minds" 
— in the original sense of the word — within the Class Mammalia.  
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FIGURE CAPTION 
 
 
Fig. 1.  Phylogeny of mirror-test performance in hominoids.  Taxa that pass the Gallup 
test by touching marks on their faces when they look in a mirror are indicated by stars 
and capital lettering.  Gibbons (gray text) do not pass the test, but what this means is 
unclear, since they also show no interest in directly visible marks on their arms.  
Published analyses of Gallup-test performance [25-26] posit an initial gain (G) of self-
awareness in the ancestral great ape and a secondary loss (L) in the gorilla lineage (white 
boxes).  But it is equally parsimonious to assume that test-passing ability evolved 
convergently in the Pongo lineage and the common ancestry of the Pan-Homo clade 
(black squares).   (Phylogram after Ref. 13) 
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